Publication Date: 6/1/73     Pages: 9     Date Entered: 1/5/93     Title: Control of Personnel Access to Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access Areas     June 1973     U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION     REGULATORY GUIDE     DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY STANDARDS     REGULATORY GUIDE 5.7     CONTROL OF PERSONNEL ACCESS TO PROTECTED AREAS,     VITAL AREAS, AND MATERIAL ACCESS AREAS A. INTRODUCTION     Proposed amendments to the Commission regulations of 10 CFR Part     50, "Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," 10 CFR Part     70, "Special Nuclear Material," and 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection     of Special Nuclear Material," would, if adopted, require measures (1)     for the protection against industrial sabotage of fuel reprocessing     plants and certain facilities subject to the provisions of 10 CFR Part     70 and (2) for the protection of special nuclear material (SNM) against     theft or diversion from certain licensed facilities.     One element of this protection is proper control of access of     personnel to and from protected areas, vital areas, and material access     areas. Searching persons and packages for firearms, explosives, and     other devices which could aid in sabotage or theft of SNM is another     element of physical protection.     This guide describes acceptable methods of searching personnel     prior to entry into a protected area and upon exit from a material     access area, and of controlling access to protected areas, vital areas,     and material access areas. B. DISCUSSION     The objective of controlling access to protected areas, vital     areas, and material access areas is to ensure that (1) only persons     authorized access to a protected area are permitted within that area and     (2) that only individuals authorized access to vital equipment or     special nuclear material will be allowed within vital areas or material     access areas.     The objective of searching individuals prior to permitting entry     into a protected area is to prevent illicit passage into the protected     area of objects such as firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices     which could aid in industrial sabotage to the facility or in the theft     of special nuclear material. Searching individuals and packages for     concealed special nuclear material at exit points from material access     areas provides a means of detecting attempted theft or diversion of     special nuclear material.     Some means by which control of access can be accomplished include     a key and lock system, a magnetic or electronic key-card system, an     attendant guard or watchman, or a closed-circuit TV (CCTV) in     conjunction with keys or key-cards. Of these means, the magnetic or     electronic key-card system in conjunction with closed-circuit TV offers     the greatest security with a minimum of personnel. The key-cards are     much more difficult to duplicate than keys and the locks cannot be     "picked." Further, the control system can "read" the key-card and record     the identity of the card (to whom it was issued) and the time of entry.     A closed-circuit TV system would allow visual observation of the access     point without requiring an attendant guard or watchman. In fact, by use     of closed-circuit TV several such access points can be maintained under     observation by a single guard or watchman. Such a system would be     especially useful at access points to remote or normally unoccupied     vital areas or material access areas. In any case, visual observation,     either directly or via CCTV, provides a positive means of assuring that     only individuals authorized access to an area pass through the access     point into the area.     Searching of individuals can be carried out by means of a hands-on     search ("frisking"), or by means of devices which will detect the     presence of weapons and explosives or SNM concealed on the individual,     or by a combination of both. The search should be conducted in a manner     which (1) provides assurance that firearms, explosives, and other such     contraband are not being carried into the protected area and that SNM is     not being transported out of a material access area and (2) minimizes     inconvenience to the individuals being searched. The use of equipment     capable of detecting weapons, explosives, or SNM is usually the     preferable form of searching, since the use of detection devices avoids     the personal imposition of a hands-on search.     An "airport type" weapon (metal) detector located in a passageway     arranged so that all individuals entering the protected area pass     through the detector provides a convenient and effective means of     searching for firearms.     Devices capable of detecting dynamite, TNT, and other explosives     can be used to search individuals for concealed explosives. Most     explosive detectors commercially available at present are of the     hand-held "sniffer" variety; hence an attendant guard or watchman must     pass the detector over the individual being searched. However, it is     possible to locate an explosive detector in a passageway and to use the     detector in the same manner that a fixed weapon detector is used.     If a hand-held explosive detector is used, the explosive check is     best made after the weapon detector has indicated that no weapon is     concealed upon the individual. This procedure affords greater     protection to the attendant guard or watchman on the presumption that     concealed explosives offer less of an immediate danger to the guard or     watchman than a concealed firearm.     One alternative approach to the hand-held explosive detector would     be the location of an explosive detector within a revolving-door frame.     The rather small volume of air trapped in a section of the revolving     door would be sampled by the explosive detector and, as the isolation of     the air volume by a revolving door section provides some concentration     of vapors emitted by any explosives within that section, the     effectiveness of the detector would be increased. To further increase     efficiency of the explosive detector, the air in the door section might     be flushed through the detector.     Searching individuals for concealed SNM upon exit from material     access areas can be accomplished in a variety of ways. For example, at     facilities processing plutonium or uranium-233 the search for concealed     SNM can be made in an attended air lock between change rooms. At areas     where only highly enriched uranium is processed, the search can be     carried out by use of a doorway SNM monitor and a metal detector in     conjunction with a closed-circuit TV (CCTV) system, hence a guard or     watchman need not be attendant. However, whether or not the access point     is attended, the use of both an SNM monitor and a metal detector would     seen necessary to assure that enriched uranium, shielded or unshielded,     is not being concealed. In addition, exit from any material access area     should be controlled to assure that all individuals and packages exiting     from a material access area pass through the SNM check system.     It is the facility guards and watchmen who are charged with the     responsibility of assuring that firearms, explosives, and other similar     items or devices are not transported into the protected area and that     SNM is not removed from a material access area without authorization.     Hence, they should search any packages being carried into the protected     area or out of a material access area. No individual should be allowed     to directly hand carry any package, valise, tool box, or similar     hand-carriable item into the protected area or out of a material access     area. Such objects should be handed to an attendant guard or watchman     who will check them and pass them into the protected area or out of the     material access area. To further reduce the possibility of concealment,     where feasible, bulky outer clothing such as overcoats, raincoats,     greatcoats, and ski jackets should be left in a cloak room provided     outside the protected area and in any case should never be taken into a     material access area. The licensee may wish to use several members of     the security force to check packages, coats, etc., during shift change     to minimize the delay encountered in gaining access. Unattended access     points into the protected area can be used, provided observation of such     points is maintained by CCTV to assure that packages are not being hand     carried into the protected area at that point.     Posting of a sign in a conspicuous location will inform     individuals requesting access into the protected area that they will be     searched, and that any packages, etc., they wish to take into the     protected area will also be searched.     Although the Commission regulations do not require searching of     individuals entering a material access area, observation of access     points provides a convenient method of ensuring that personnel do not     carry weapons, explosives, and other similar items or devices into the     material access area.     In emergency situations, such as those which may require the     evacuation of a material access area, the objectives of access control     and search should not be allowed to compromise health and safety.     Hence, the licensee should develop plans of action and provide areas and     equipment for searching and controlling access under emergency     conditions compatible with the objectives of both safety and security.     Such emergency procedures will minimize the effectiveness of an     emergency situation deliberately perpetrated to conceal theft of SNM.     Administrative controls, as well as physical barriers where     applicable, may be employed to gather evacuating individuals within a     holding area. Such controls would serve both to verify that no one has     remained in the evacuated area and to ensure that an emergency situation     will not successfully conceal an attempted theft of SNM. C. DEFINITIONS     For the purpose of this guide the following definitions are     provided: 1. "Guard" means an armed and uniformed individual whose primary duty     is the protection of materials and property to the extent that theft of     SNM or sabotage of the facility could pose a threat to the common     defense and security or result in a radiological hazard to public health     and safety. 2. "Watchman" means an unarmed individual, not necessarily uniformed,     who provides protection for materials and property in the course of     performing other duties. 3. "Patrol watchman" means an arms-qualified individual whose primary     duty, at least during threat or emergency situations, is the protection     of material and property, and who is normally unarmed but who may be     armed during emergency or threat situations. A patrol watchman may or     may not be uniformed. D. REGULATORY POSITION 1. Protected Areas     a. Identity and Authorization     At each access point into a protected area, an identity and     access authorization check should be made in conjunction with a search     for firearms and explosives. Such identity and access authorization     checks should be performed by an attendant guard or watchman or by means     of an electronic or magnetic key-card system and a closed-circuit TV     system. Packages should be taken into the protected area only at access     points attended by a guard or watchman. If the access point is     unattended, the individual monitoring the access point via     closed-circuit TV should carefully observe any individual requesting     access at that point to ensure that no packages are being carried into     the protected area.     b. Personnel Search     If the search of individuals is to be carried out by means     of detection equipment, a weapon (metal) detector and an explosive     detector should be used. An acceptable arrangement for the use of     detection equipment in a secure access passageway is illustrated in     Figure 1. The doors on the secure access passageway should be     interlocked so that both cannot be simultaneously open, thus providing     positive access control. An explicit enabling act should be required of     a security individual, either attending the secure access passageway or     in the central alarm station, to open the inner door.     c. Metal Detector     The metal detector located within the secure access     passageway should be capable of detecting a minimum of 200 grams of     non-ferrous metal placed anywhere on the body at a 90% confidence limit.     The false alarm rate should be a maximum of 1%.     d. Explosive Detector     The explosive detector, as a minimum, hould be capable of     detecting dynamite, TNT, and similar nitrogen compounds in minimum     amounts of 200 grams at a 90% confidence limit. The false alarm rate     should be a maximum of 1%. If detector is hand held rather than     permanently fixed to a passageway or revolving door frame, hence     requiring an attendant guard or watchman, the search for explosives     should be performed after the search for firearms. An acceptable     arrangement is illustrated in Figure 2.     e. Alarm Annunciation     The alarms of the weapon detector and the explosive detector     should annunciate at the location of the detectors, if attended, as well     as in a central alarm station. The alarm annunciation at the location     of the detectors need not be aural.     f. Alarm System     The alarms of the weapon (metal) detector and the explosive     detector should be interfaced with the inner door lock so that, with an     alarm triggered, the inner door cannot be opened from either side     without a specific action by the individual manning the central alarm     station acknowledging the alarm and enabling the inner door to be     opened. 2. Material Access Areas Containing Pu or U-233     a. Change Room Exit     Checking for concealed plutonium or uranium-233 at an exit     point from a material access area into a protected area should be     performed in an attended secure access passageway located between change     rooms. An acceptable arrangement is shown in Figure 3. Unless exit is     into a contiguous material access area, all individuals should exit from     a material access area, other than a vault, only via the change rooms     and should be required to deposit all work clothing in the inner change     room, walk through the passageway, and dress in street clothing in the     outer change room. The licensee should generally not allow packages to     be transported out of the material access area via the change rooms.     Showers, except those used exclusively for health physics, should be     located in the outer change room. A guard or watchman need not be     attendant except when personnel are exiting from the material access     area.     b. SNM Detector     An SNM detector should be located within the passageway.     The detector should be capable of detecting 0.5 gram of plutonium or 1     gram of uranium-233 shielded by 3 mm of brass concealed anywhere on an     individual at a 90% confidence limit. The false alarm rate on the     detector should be less than 0.1%.     c. Door Interlock     The doors of the attended secure access passageway should be     interlocked so that both cannot be simultaneously open. The doors     should also be alarmed so that an explicit action must be taken by     either the attendant security individual or the individual manning the     central alarm station to enable either door to open without triggering     the alarm.     d. Packages     All packages, including waste barrels and work clothes     hampers, being transported out of a material access area should be     checked by an attendant guard or watchman for concealed SNM, preferably     at an exit point expressly provided for packages. SNM packages should     be checked for proper seals, identification, and transfer documentation.     e. Change Room Access     Access by personnel into a material access area should be     permitted only through the change rooms. Control of access should be     accomplished either by a guard or watchman attending the secure access     passageway between the change rooms, or by a combination of key-card and     CCTV when the passageway is unattended.     f. Observation of Individuals     Procedures should be employed in the control of access to     material access areas to ensure that no lone individual is allowed     within a material access area without some means to observe that     individual's activities. 3. Material Access Areas Containing Highly Enriched Uranium, and     Vaults Containing SNM     a. Exit     At material access area exit points, the check for concealed     SNM should be carried out by means of an SNM doorway monitor and a metal     detector. A secure access passageway located at the exit point from the     material access area should house the detection equipment. An attendant     guard or watchman or a closed-circuit TV connected to the central alarm     station should also be provided. Administrative procedures should     require the passage of packages only through attended exit points. The     doors of the secure access passageway should be interlocked so that both     cannot be simultaneously open. A suggested layout is illustrated in     Figure 4.     b. SNM Detector     The SNM doorway monitor in the secure access passageway     should be capable of detecting a minimum of 3 grams uranium enriched to     90% in the uranium-235 isotope in 3 mm of brass concealed anywhere on an     individual at a 50% confidence limit. The false alarm rate should not     exceed 0.1%.     c. Metal Detector     The metal detector in the secure access passageway should be     capable of detecting a minimum of 100 grams of non-ferrous metal     (shielding) at a 90% confidence limit concealed anywhere on an     individual. The false alarm rate should not exceed 0.1%.     d. Alarms     The doors of the secure access passageway should be alarmed     and interfaced with the doorway monitor such that an individual can be     detained for a sufficient time for the doorway monitor to operate. If     an individual passes through without waiting for the proper period of     time (perhaps indicated by a light) the alarm should sound. The doorway     monitor and metal detector alarms and the door alarms should annunciate     in the central alarm station and may also annunciate at the passageway.     e. Access     The exit points from the material access area should be used     for access points as well. Control of access should be by either the     attendant security individual or by a key-card CCTV system.     f. Closed-Circuit TV Observation     If observation of the passageway is accomplished by CCTV,     the guard or watchman monitoring the passageway should carefully observe     any individual within to ensure that no packages are being carried into     or out of the access area.     g. Observation of Individuals     Procedures should be employed in the control of access to     material access areas to ensure that no lone individual is allowed     within a material access area without some means to observe that     individual's activities.     h. Vaults     A key-card CCTV system should be employed to control access     to and from a vault if such access and exit points do not open to or     from material access areas contiguous to the vault. In addition, all     individuals who transport SNM between material access areas or to or     from a vault, should be escorted by a member of the facility's security     force during any period of the transport that the SNM is not within a     material access area. 4. Vital Areas     Control of access into vital areas should be accomplished either     by an attendant guard or watchman, or by means of magnetic or electronic     key-card access in conjunction with closed-circuit TV. The     identification check should include either direct observation by an     attendant guard or watchman or observation by CCTV of each individual     passing into the vital area, or some alternate means (e.g., an escort)     which will provide positive assurance that only individuals authorized     access to the vital area are permitted to pass into that area. 5. Security Force Response to an Alarm     The guards and patrol watchmen should be trained and prepared to     protect the facility from sabotage and the SNM within from theft.     a. Protected Area Access Point     Upon annunciation of an alarm from explosive or weapon     detection equipment located at a protected area access point attended by     a lone guard or watchman, a guard should be dispatched immediately to     the access point originating the alarm. If the access point is     unattended, two guards should be sent to the access point. At the     access point the guard or watchman should request that the individual's     pockets be emptied and that the individual pass again through the     detection equipment. If the individual complies and if the alarms do     not register, the individual may be allowed to pass into the protected     area after the contents of the individual's pockets have been examined     verifying that no attempt has been made to pass explosives or firearms     into the protected area. If, however, an alarm continues to register,     the individual should be physically searched by an unarmed security     individual, while at least one guard or armed patrol watchman observes,     to verify that no firearms or explosives are yet concealed by the     individual. If the individual refuses to comply with the request for     further searching, or if a weapon or explosives are found, the     individual should be denied access.     b. Material Access Area Exit Point     If an SNM or metal detector alarm or a door alarm is     triggered at a material access area exit point attended by a guard or     watchman or at an unattended exit point, security personnel, at least     one of whom is armed (a guard or armed patrol watchman), should be     dispatched to that exit point. The individual should be searched by     emptying pockets and passing again through the detection equipment or by     a hands-on search performed by an unarmed security individual while at     least one guard or armed patrol watchman observes. The cause of the     alarm should be determined before the individual is released. If the     cause of the alarm was an object, metal or SNM, not concealed by the     individual, the individual should be searched without the object to     ensure that the object is not a decoy and that SNM is not still being     concealed by the individual. If the security personnel determine that     attempted unauthorized removal of SNM has been made with the intent to     steal SNM, local police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation should     be contacted, and the individual should be held by the security     personnel until the local police arrive and arrest the individual.     c. Unoccupied Vital Areas and Material Access Areas     If unauthorized entry is made or attempted into a vital area     or material access area, or if an intrusion alarm protecting an     unoccupied vital or material access area is triggered, two armed     security personnel should be dispatched immediately to the area of     alarm. If, however, the area of the alarm can be observed by CCTV, the     guard or watchman in the alarm station where the TV monitor is located     should first verify the existence of intrusion and assess the extent of     a threat, if any, before dispatching the security personnel. If the     existence of an intrusion is verified, either by CCTV or security     personnel in the area, a law enforcement authority should be notified     immediately. If possible, the intruder(s) found by the security     personnel should be searched and detained until arrest by local police. 6. Emergency Procedures     The licensee should provide procedures and equipment to maintain     the level of access control and SNM and facility protection during     conditions of emergency or equipment failure. Emergency procedures     should be developed and executed in a manner consistent with safety.     a. Evacuation Procedures     During emergency conditions which require evacuation of part     or all of the facility, temporary SNM checking stations should be     established at the perimeter of the protected area or at a personnel     collection area outside the protected area. All individuals should be     searched for concealed SNM before being released from the protected area     or collection area. In addition, a roll of all individuals who had     entered the evacuated area should be taken to ensure that all have     evacuated safely. If an evacuation or other emergency alarm sounds,     guards and watchmen should take position at prearranged surveillance     points to ensure that:     (1) Proper evacuation routes are being observed,     (2) SNM is not being tossed over the protected area     perimeter barrier, and     (3) No one attempts to gain unauthorized access to the     protected area during the emergency.     b. Failed Detection Equipment     Failed detection equipment should be repaired as quickly as     possible. In the interim, alternate access or exit points or hand-held     detection devices or hands-on search procedures should be employed. In     no case should the failure of equipment be allowed to compromise the     protection of the facility or the SNM within the facility.     (Due to database constraints, Figures 1-4 are not included. Please     contact LIS to obtain a copy.)     44